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Abstract - Network Address Translation or NAT, is a 
technology that is used to translate internal addresses to 
globally routable addresses on the internet.  NAT continues to 
be used extensively in almost every network due to the current 
lack of IPv4 addresses.  Despite being exceptionally 
commonplace, this networking technique is not without its 
weaknesses, and can be disabled with a fairly straightforward 
attack.  By overpopulating the translation table, the primary 
mechanism used to translate the internal  to external 
addresses, an attacker can effectively deny all internal users 
access to the external network.  This paper takes an in-depth 
look at how five different vendors: Cisco, Extreme, Linksys, 
VMWare, and Vyatta, implement the translation table during 
active NAT sessions and how they are affected by TCP, UDP, 
and ICMP variations of the DOS attack. 
Keywords:  Computer Network Security, Denial of Service, 
Network Address Translation, NAT 
Track:  Network Security Engineering  
1 Introduction 
 Network Address Translation is a technology that is 
so widely deployed, it can be found in almost every home and 
in every company that has an enterprise network.  With the 
scarcity of public IPv4 addresses, NAT with port translation 
has become a necessity when organizations need to provide 
Internet access to multiple users on the inside of their 
network.  Devices that do the translations keep track of these 
connections in the NAT translation table.  This table maps 
inside and outside ports and IP addresses so that internal hosts 
can have multiple concurrent conversations with the outside 
world.  However, this creates a single point of failure in the 
network.  If the translation table becomes too full or non-
functional, the internal network could suffer connectivity 
issues when trying to reach the global network.  This makes 
translation tables a prime candidate for denial of service 
attacks by a malicious user.   
 
 Therefore, it is important to understand how different 
vendors handle translation table behavior, especially in an 
enterprise environment which contains devices from multiple 
vendors.  This paper will analyze how several different 
vendors handle NAT translation table size and how the 
devices react once the tables have been filled to capacity.  
Additionally, this paper will determine whether or not a small 
number of devices on the inside network can easily and 
effectively deny service to other users on the network by 
targeting the translation table on these NAT devices. 
 
2 Background and Problem Statement 
 NAT is a networking function that is widely 
deployed in networks today.  The IETF defines NAT as a 
"method by which IP address are mapped from one realm to 
another, in an attempt to provide transparent routing to hosts" 
[3].    NAT with Port Translation or NAPT is the most 
common and widely deployed version of NAT.  The main 
function of NAPT is the conservation of global IP addresses 
by mapping a large number of private internal host addresses 
to a single external host address [1].  Essentially, NAPT 
provides a way for an intermediate device to map and 
translate internal IP addresses and ports to an external IP 
address on a different port. 
 
 One of the most important and complicated portions 
of NAPT has to deal with keeping track of the sessions that 
are in use.  RFC 2663 identifies TCP and UDP sessions by 
keeping track of the: 
 
 Source IP address 
 Source TCP/UDP port 
 Target IP address 
 Target TCP/UDP port 
 
 ICMP tracking is similar except that the NAPT 
device keeps track of the ICMP query ID instead of TCP/UDP 
ports [3].  These properties create unique entries in the 
translation table and can be used to create a virtually limitless 
number of permutations for use in translation.   
 
2.1 The Problem 
 
 In order to segment networks from the internet and 
preserve IP addresses, businesses and households around the 
world use NAT with Port Translation to map multiple internal 
hosts to a small number of globally routable public IPs [3].  
As far as internal users are concerned, this process is 
supposed to be transparent, however if this process were to be 
disrupted, multiple if not all users on the internal network 
would be affected.  The translation table which maps internal 
ports to external ports for active connections serves as a single 
point of failure and could be targeted in order to deny service 
to a large number of users. 
 
 Because every conversation that is going from the 
internal network to the external network has to be mapped and 
tracked, NAPT is an incredibly processor intensive task when 
compared to many other services a router could provide.  In 
addition, every packet that goes through the NAT translation 
has to be rewritten; checksums need to be recalculated, along 
with many other changes [1].   Consequently, the more 
translations that occur, the more processor time is consumed 
to perform the NAT operations.   
 
 This can lead to performance degradation for all 
functions on the router if the NAT process consumes the 
available processing resources.  As a result, if an attacker 
could create a situation where the NAT has so much work to 
do that it consumes all of the resources, they could cause 
failures not only for the NAT process, but also other functions 
that the router is supposed to handle (access lists, routing 
protocols, DHCP leases, etc.).   
 
 While there are many specifications on how NAT 
with Port Translation should operate, many of the 
implementation choices are not explicitly defined.  Important 
details such as table entry timeouts for the different protocols, 
maximum translation table size, and entry tracking are left up 
to the vendors [3].  If the implementation discrepancies 
between vendors are significant enough, they could result in 
significant impact to network performance and application 
functionality.  The next sections will provide scenarios that 
will demonstrate these issues and will provide data we can use 
to determine the differences in how each vendor implements 
NAPT. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
 
 For all tests involving physical devices, the topology 
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 In this diagram there are two networks, one internal 
and one external.  There are two normal hosts on the internal 
network and an attacker that will launch an attack against the 
NAT device in the middle.  The outside host is there to 
receive traffic and to provide an end point to determine if a 
loss of connectivity occurs.  The main questions here are: can 
a single attacker device overwhelm the NAT device with 
translations thereby blocking legitimate traffic from exiting?  
What happens when the translation table on the NAT device 
becomes full? 
 
 For all tests involving the VMWare Virtual NAT 
Process, the topology in figure 2 was constructed. 
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 Like the physical topology there is an internal and an 
external network that the attacker will attempt to disrupt. 
Our hypothesis is that the attacker will be able to deny access 
to the external network by targeting the translation device.  By 
creating a large number of translations, the attacker would be 
able to deny access to the outside by either filling the 
translation table or by consuming all of the available 
resources on the translating device. 
 
3.1 Default Device Timers 
 
 Since the RFC documents regarding NAT only give 
recommendations on what the expiration timers should be for 
TCP, UDP, and ICMP entries, the individual vendors have 
their own default settings for each of these entries.  These 
values are important because they determine the amount of 
time an attacker has to fill the table before the entries start 
expiring. 
 
 TCP Syn Fin/RST UDP ICMP 
Cisco 24 60 60 secs 5 mins 60 
hours secs secs 
Extreme 2 mins 60 
secs 
60 secs 2 mins 3 secs 
Linksys N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Vyatta 12 
hours 









1.  TCP Default refers to all translated TCP ports that are not 
specified in the Cisco IOS (DNS and a few other services 
have their own special timeouts). 
 
2.  Timers on the Linksys device are not configurable by the 
user. 
 
3.  The vmnetnat.conf configuration file for the VMWare 
NAT process does not have a configurable field for TCP 
timeout.  Additionally, there is no way to view the translation 
table for diagnostic testing to find out the default timeout. 
 
4.  Timers on the Vyatta device are not configurable by the 
user.  
 
3.2 Attack Types 
 
 In order to determine the effects of the different 
protocols on multiple platforms, we had to create a number of 
scenarios.  We tested attacks using TCP, UDP, and ICMP 
entries into the table.  Each of these three tests were done 
against the five different vendors: Cisco, Extreme, Vyatta, 
Linksys, and VMWare.   
 
 If the attacker proves unsuccessful in filling the 
translation table for a device using the default timers, the 
experiments will be repeated for that device using unlimited 
timeout periods for each protocol.  This will allow us to 
determine the effects of the attack on the device if it were to 
be successful. 
 
3.3 Attack Scripts 
 
 The scripts used to execute the attacks were simple 
bash scripts that called several concurrent sessions of NMAP.  
These NMAP scans would attempt to reach various addresses 
on the outside on a variety of different ports.  This allows the 
attacker to generate numerous translation table entries in a 
very short period of time.  The scripts were very similar, with 
the main difference being in the –s options that changed the 
protocol being used by NMAP. 
 
Table 1:  TCP Attack Script 
#!/bin/bash 
for ((i=0; i<300; i++)) 
do 




Table 2:  UDP Attack Script 
#!/bin/bash 
for ((i=0; i<300; i++)) 
do 




 There was one alteration that had to be made during 
the UDP experiment.  The Cisco device would not register the 
UDP entries in the translation table unless it received some 
sort of reply from the outside on those ports.  Therefore, the 
UDP Attack Script in the Cisco scenario pointed to the outside 
host instead of a range of non-existent hosts. 
 
Table 3:  Cisco UDP Attack Script 
#!/bin/bash 
for ((i=0; i<300; i++)) 
do 




Table 4:  ICMP Attack Script 
#!/bin/bash 
for ((i=0; i<300; i++)) 
do 






 The topology for each test was set up as shown in the 
figures above with three PCs connected to a switch behind a 
NAT device which then connected to an external host on the 
external network.  The only exception was the VMWare test 
where the topology consisted of two VMs on the internal 
virtual network and one physical host on the external network.  
The external host was hosting an FTP server and a TFTP 
server which had access one large movie file to transfer.  Only 
one NAT device from one vendor would be tested every time.  
Each vendor device would run through the test 5 times to 
ensure the validity of the data. 
 
 Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings 
to each other to verify connectivity.  This also allowed for 
verification that the NAT translations were occurring 
correctly between the inside network and the external 
network.  After initial connectivity and translation 
functionality were established, an internal host tested TCP and 
UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP between the inside 
and outside.  After full functionality was determined, a 
unidirectional JPerf test was run between an inside host and 
the outside host.  This ensured that the NAT device could not 
be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device.  
After all of the testing had finished, commands would be 
issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and 
reset the NAT statistics when applicable. 
 
 After the verification process, the attacker would 
kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch) would be 
started.  Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then 
the NMAP processes would be killed.  Every minute during 
the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the internal 
gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host.  
Additionally, every minute, the internal hosts would attempt 
to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to 
transfer a file.  Also, every minute the relevant commands 
would be issued to the NAT device (when applicable) to 
determine the number of translations and to verify that the 
correct translations were being put into the translation table. 
 After the attack had completed, internal hosts would 
then attempt to ping each other, the internal gateway, the 
external gateway, and the external host.  Additionally, internal 
hosts would then attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions 
with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie file.  
This process would be repeated until all attempts were 
successful or until 15 minutes elapsed. 
 These tests would be run initially using the default 
timers on the devices.  However if the attacker could not fill 
the translation table for a particular device with any of the 
attacks, then tests would be run on that specific device using 
unlimited timers.  This would allow us to observe the 
consequences of filling the translation table on that device. 
4.1  Problems Encountered 
 During the course of our experiments, we did run 
into a few issues during the testing.  Unfortunately some of 
the devices had very little or no visibility into what was 
happening during the translation process.  The Linksys device 
was the worst for this since it did not have any relevant means 
of logging NAT Translations.  This problem was exacerbated 
by the fact that all management for the Linksys device was in-
band, which became unreachable during the attack.  The 
VMWare NAT process also had no means to debug the 
translations while they were occurring.  This meant that all we 
had to go on were the results of the experiments to determine 
what was actually going on during the attack.   
 Another issue was the processing limitations of the 
devices used to execute the attacks.  In most cases it was a 
netbook that had very little processing power, which limited 
the number of translations we could do within a certain period 
of time.  In the other cases it was a virtual machine with very 
limited resources (in the VMWare tests).  We originally wrote 
the scripts to loop 1000 times to maximize the number of 
IMAP instances running, but ultimately had to scale it down 
to 300 concurrent sessions to keep the attacking machines 
from locking up. 
4.2  Metrics 
 In order to determine whether connectivity was 
affected or not, every minute of the attack we would run:  
ICMP echo requests to the outside, a TFTP transfer to the 
outside, and an FTP transfer to the outside.  We would also 
look at the current size of the translation table along with the 
CPU utilization on the device in question.  The final thing we 
would watch for was whether or not the packets the outside 
device was receiving were being translated (by looking at the 
source address of the traffic).  
5 Results and Discussion 
 The results of this experiment show that a small 
number of compromised nodes with the right software can 
severely impact enterprise grade equipment in a short period 
of time. While almost all platforms tested were negatively 
impacted by the TCP and UDP attacks, the effectiveness of 
certain protocols for filling the translation tables varied from 
vendor to vendor.  Additionally, filling the translation tables 
also had varied effects on the devices performing the NAT 
translations depending on what vendor created the device.   
 On the Cisco device, the translations filled the 
available memory on the device which not only prevented 
new entries from being entered into the table (and therefore 
being translated) it also caused memory allocation errors 
which negatively impacted other processes that the router was 
performing.  The Cisco device fared better against the TCP 
attacks due to its session tracking capability and the 
aggressive timeouts on the SYN packets.  The UDP attack on 
the other hand was able to fill the table on this device and 
deny translation capabilities to all other devices on the 
network.  
 The Extreme device on the other hand, limited the 
number of NAT translations allowed on one address instead 
of letting it consume all of the other memory.  This allowed 
for smaller number of total entries, but preserved the integrity 
of the device when the table was filled.  The Extreme device 
fared very well against both TCP and UDP attacks due to its 
very aggressive default timers.  However, these timers are a 
double edged sword and by defying best practices and 
standards laid down in the RFCs, could cause problems on a 
network with higher latency times.  For example, in the case 
of the Extreme device, the two minute default TCP timer 
could cause certain TCP applications to fail because it expires 
so quickly.  TCP logical connections can last for a very long 
time even if connectivity is temporarily disrupted or there isn't 
any traffic to send for a period of time.  By expiring these 
TCP entries, the internal host will have to establish a new 
session to the outside and most likely start the conversation 
over. 
The Linksys device by far fared the worst of all the devices 
that were tested.  It was unable to handle the processing load 
of translating such a large amount of requests and therefore 
became completely unreachable during the attack.  TCP and 
UDP attacks were equally effective against this device.  
Unfortunately, the lack of accessibility during the attack (in-
band management only) and limited logging made any more 
insight into the operation of this device all but impossible. 
 While the VMWare device fared well against the 
UDP attack (unlike the Cisco device) it was severely impacted 
by the TCP attack.  Service was denied during the attack and 
unlike the rest of the devices tested, TCP and UDP 
connections could no longer be established even after the 
attack had ended.  The only way to restore full connectivity 
was to restart the VMWare NAT service.  This would pose a 
significant problem to network administrators since outside 
connectivity would appear to be restored (ICMP echo requests 
would work), but any service related applications would cease 
to function.  Unfortunately, the VMWare NAT process has 
limited configuration and debug capabilities so determining 
the exact cause of this disruption is also next to impossible. 
 The Vyatta device fared extremely well during these 
tests.  These attacks didn't appear to have any impact despite 
having several thousand translations entered into the table.  
Due to the resources at my disposal, the only device to test 
this platform was markedly more powerful than the other 
devices tested in this series of experiments.  Interestingly 
enough, Vyatta also defies RFC recommendations by not 
allowing for the administrator to adjust any of the timers that 
are used in the translation process.  Additionally, while I was 
unable to do so in my experiments, the default TCP timer is 
extremely long and the Vyatta device doesn't appear to do any 
session tracking (unlike the Extreme or Cisco devices).  This 
could possibly be exploited on a device that is less powerful 
or being actively utilized on an enterprise network. 
 It is interesting to note however, that unlike when the 
CAM (Content Addressable Memory) table, which holds the 
MAC address / port entries, becomes full on a switch, the 
NAT device does not "fail open" and pass all traffic.  When 
the translation table became full (in all cases where this was 
possible), no new translations could occur and the NAT 
devices would drop any new traffic not already in the table.  
Another point to note is that the NAT devices did not FIFO 
any translation entries.  While expired entries were FIFO'd 
out, if the table became full, the entries remained in the table 
until they expired.  Therefore, new entries could not be added 
until the old entries expired (which could be a significant 
amount of time).   
 Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn 
from these experiments is that the differing implementations 
of NAT between the vendors (especially in the case of timers) 
could cause interoperability issues if a connection has to 
traverse a NAT device on the source end and the destination 
end.  While TCP connections are generally given a duly long 
amount of time before expiration, UDP connection timeouts 
varied greatly between the vendors.  With VMWare and 
Vyatta allowing only 30 seconds before the UDP entry times 
out, significant application issues could occur over high 
latency networks that span long distances. 
 The relatively small number of compromised nodes 
required to execute the attack paired with the fact that NAT 
generally causes a single point of failure for a large number of 
users makes this a relatively easy and effective type of denial 
of service attack to execute.  Furthermore, while it may be 
difficult to fill up a translation table on a device with a 
significant amount of memory, the effects of the attack on the 
processing capabilities of the NAT devices makes this attack 
scalable to almost any network size.  Therefore, we can 
conclude that this attack is viable in an enterprise setting and 




 The main ways that the NAT denial of service attack 
takes advantage of the NAT device is to either fill up the 
translation table to prevent new entries or to create so many 
entries that the processor on the device cannot keep up.  
Therefore the most obvious way to mitigate the effects of this 
attack is to limit the number of translations that hosts are 
allowed to make.  Making a rule that limits the number of 
overall translations allowed is common, and while this may 
solve the issue of high CPU utilization, this technique makes 
it easier for the attacker to fill the table and deny service to 
legitimate users service.  Because of this, limiting the number 
of translations must be applicable to individual hosts.   
 Cisco has features in place in their IOS to 
accomplish this goal relatively well.  Most platforms support 
rate limiting of some kind, but the Cisco platform supports 
rate limiting by either the total number of translations, the 
number of translations that can be created by a list (that 
includes a number of hosts), and the number of translations a 
specific host can make [6].  Obviously limiting the total 
number of translations would prove counter-productive, and 
while limiting the number of translations a specified host can 
use is fine on a smaller network, this mitigation technique 
cannot scale to a large network.   
 The Extreme device on the other hand supports what 
the vendor calls "Auto-constraining," which limits the amount 
of ports a single internal host can use at one time [7].  This 
works by evenly distributing the amount of port space 
between each internal user evenly [7].  While this is easy to 
configure and can be effective in smaller networks, this 
feature could end up preventing legitimate users from making 
new connections in a scenario where there are a large number 
of internal users and a very small number of external 
addresses to map to. 
 Unfortunately, the Linksys, VMWare, and Vyatta 
platforms don't appear to support any of these types of 
features at all which makes stopping this type of attack much 
more difficult when using these platforms. 
 Another feature that is built into most NAT platforms 
is the ability to control the amount of time that passes before 
an entry in the table expires.  This is best evidenced by the 
table on the Extreme device that couldn't be filled in this 
experiment using the normal timers.  Unfortunately the Vyatta 
and Linksys platforms do not allow the administrator to 
configure these timers, which makes them less able to prevent 
the NAT DOS attack.  However, administrators need to be 
careful when setting these timers since they could time out 
legitimate sessions prematurely and cause applications to 
malfunction, especially in higher latency networks with a high 
traffic volume.   
6 Conclusions 
 The purpose of this paper is to closely examine 
infrastructure security risks when using NAT with Port 
Translation.  Additionally, this paper analyzes the default 
behavior of NAPT devices from different vendors.  The 
results of these experiments show that a single device on the 
internal network is capable of overwhelming the translation 
table.  These experiments also show that the default behavior 
when implementing NAPT varies significantly between 
vendors.  Default timers, entry behavior, and configurable 
settings are all vendor specific.  We believe that the almost 
universal use of NAPT justifies further investigation and 
standardization of its use.  The reality is that most consumers 
utilize NAPT and do not consider that the very mechanisms 
that allow it to work can be taken advantage of to the 
detriment of all internal hosts.  As the various experiments 
outlined in the paper show, many vendors use default 
behaviors that leave their devices open to exploitation when 
implementing NAPT.  Furthermore, some vendors do not 
even offer the ability to change crucial settings that could be 
used to mitigate this type of attack. 
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